This paper provides an updated assessment of economically efficient taxes on gasoline (used by light-duty vehicles) and diesel (used by heavy-duty trucks) to address various highway externalities in the United States. The (second-best) corrective fuel taxes are estimated, and we discuss the implications of fuel economy regulations and prospective (nationwide) controls on carbon emissions. We also examine how optimal fuel taxes depend on how they interact with the broader fiscal system.
Introduction
The United States imposes, at the federal and state level, excise taxes of about 40 cents/gallon on gasoline and 45 cents/gallon on diesel for heavy trucks, where the federal tax on these fuels is currently 18.4 and 24.4 cents/gallon respectively (FHWA 2007, Tables 8.2.1 and 8.2.3) . US tax rates are low by international standards, for example, in many European countries gasoline taxes exceed $2/gallon, though the United States is somewhat unusual in taxing diesel more heavily than gasoline, albeit only slightly (see Figure 1) .
Traditionally, the level of fuel taxes in the United States has been governed by highway spending needs-fuel tax revenues account for about two-thirds of the approximately $100 billion in revenues raised from all highway user fees.
1 However, there is growing debate about both the appropriate level of federal fuel taxes and their status as a dedicated revenue source.
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One reason is the weakening link between fuel taxes and highway spending, as a rising portion of this spending has been financed through non-highway revenues (e.g., local sales and property taxes), while some fuel tax revenues have been diverted for other purposes (e.g., transit projects). Moreover, there is concern about the erosion of real fuel tax revenues per vehicle mile, especially with the recent tightening of fuel economy regulations, and the failure of nominal tax rates to rise with inflation (federal gasoline and diesel taxes were last increased in 1993). However, whether revenues are earmarked or not, the key (though poorly understood) economic issue is what level of fuel taxation is warranted on fiscal grounds.
Another reason for interest in fuel taxes is the increasingly apparent disparity-due to inadequate taxation-between the societal cost of automobile trips and the private cost borne by motorists. These broader costs reflect the global warming potential of CO 2 emissions and, possibly, consequences from the economy's dependence on a volatile world oil market under the influence of unstable suppliers (see Figure 2 ). Gasoline and (truck) diesel fuel accounted for 20 and 6 percent respectively, of nationwide carbon emissions in 2008, and for 46 and 13 percent of oil use, respectively. Finally, recent and prospective developments in related policies have implications for efficient fuel taxation, including the new fuel economy regulations and the possibility of a nationwide greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program. Furthermore, advances in electronic metering technology, and experience with area pricing in London, have raised the prospects for vehicle mileage tolls in the United States, which are a far better tool for congestion management than fuel taxes (Santos and Fraser 2006) . Similarly, there is growing interest in pay-as-you-drive automobile insurance as a way to internalize accident externalities (Bordhoff and Noel 2008, Greenberg 2009 ).
It is therefore an opportune time for an updated assessment of the appropriate role of fuel taxes. Here we focus largely on efficiency considerations, that is, what the ideal tax system should look like from a purely economic perspective. The conceptual framework for optimal fuel taxes has been developed previously. Moreover, there is substantial empirical literature on highway externalities in the United States, and behavioral responses to fuel prices, though in some cases (e.g., global warming damages) the literature remains highly unsettled. This paper pulls together prior analytical studies, updates parameter values, and provides some new findings. The latter relate to the implications of recent policy developments and of alternative revenue recycling options. The paper also provides a comparison of optimal gasoline and diesel taxes for the United States, using consistent methodology and assumptions.
We summarize some key points as follows.
In our baseline assessment, the corrective gasoline tax is $1.23/gallon, with congestion and accidents together accounting for about three quarters of this tax. This estimate might be viewed as a lower bound, as we use conservative values for global warming and perhaps for oil dependence externalities, both of which are highly unsettled. However, if a binding, nationwide cap-and-trade program were introduced, there would be no global warming benefit, as emissions are fixed. On the other hand, the corrective tax may rise to $2/gallon in the presence of (pervasively binding) fuel economy regulations. In this case, more of a given, tax-induced gasoline reduction must come from reduced driving (and less from fuel economy improvements), which magnifies the congestion and accident benefits per gallon of fuel reduction. Conversely, pricing of congestion and other externalities through mileage tolls would dramatically lower the corrective gasoline tax, conceivably even below its current level, though such comprehensive tolling is likely a long way off.
However, an unbiased assessment of fuel taxes must account for how they interact with distortions in the economy created by the broader fiscal system. In fact, the optimal gasoline tax is extremely sensitive to alternative revenue uses. Conceivably, it could rise to $3/gallon if revenues are recycled in highly efficient ways, most notably cuts in income taxes that distort factor markets and create a bias towards tax-favored spending. On the other hand, if recycling does not increase efficiency, the case for higher gasoline taxes appears to be reversed. This because efficiency gains from externality mitigation are counteracted by efficiency losses in the labor market, as higher fuel prices drive up transportation prices relative to leisure.
Under baseline parameters, we put the corrective diesel tax at $1.15/gallon, though underlying determinants are different than for the corrective gasoline tax. Road damage plays a significant role in the corrective diesel tax. Congestion and accidents are less important (even though trucks take up more road space), because a given tax-induced reduction in diesel saves only about a third as many vehicle miles as the same reduction in gasoline, due the lower miles per gallon of heavy trucks. Again however, when we account for interactions with the broader fiscal system, the optimal tax is highly dependent on revenue use, and varies between essentially zero when revenues are returned lump-sum and $3.00 per gallon when revenues finance income tax reductions.
Our optimal tax estimates should not be taken too literally because we are relying on parameter evidence that is tentative in some cases, if not highly speculative (e.g., for oil dependence externalities). No doubt fuel tax assessments will evolve over time, perhaps even radically, as valuation methodologies are refined, transportation characteristics change (e.g., emission rates, congestion levels), and with related policy developments (e.g., the spread of congestion pricing).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides conceptual details on the corrective gasoline tax. Section 3 presents calculations of this tax. Section 4 discusses linkages between fuel taxes and the broader fiscal system. Section 5 discusses optimal diesel taxes. A final section offers concluding remarks and briefly discusses some caveats, including distributional concerns, feasibility, and the role of induced innovation.
Corrective Gasoline Tax: Analytical Underpinnings
Currently, for the United States, it is reasonable to assume gasoline and diesel are used exclusively by passenger vehicles and heavy trucks respectively. Therefore we can focus on passenger vehicle externalities when assessing gasoline taxes and heavy truck externalities when assessing diesel taxes (with one caveat, noted later). 3 Consider, based on a modified version of Parry and Small (2005) , a long run, static model where the representative household solves the following optimization problem:
All variables are in per capita terms and a bar denotes an economy-wide variable perceived as exogenous by individuals.
v denotes the vehicle stock (vehicle choice is continuous variable as we are averaging over many households), m is miles driven per vehicle, and g is gasoline consumption per mile driven, or the inverse of fuel economy. G and M are therefore aggregate gasoline consumption and miles driven, respectively. X is a general consumption good. E G (.) and E M (.) are externalities that vary in proportion with gasoline and mileage, respectively (see below). I denotes (fixed) household income and GOV is a government transfer, to capture the recycling of fuel tax revenues (alternative revenue uses are discussed later). c(g) is the fixed cost of vehicle ownership, which is higher for more fuel-efficient vehicles, reflecting the added production costs of incorporating fuel-saving technologies. p G and p X denote the fixed producer prices for gasoline and the general good, while t G is the (nationwide average) gasoline excise tax. t M is a unit tax on vehicle mileage. Households choose v, m, g and X to maximize utility u(.) subject to a budget constraint equating income with spending on gasoline, mileage taxes, vehicles, and other goods (λ is a Lagrange multiplier). 4 E G (.) includes greenhouse gases and possible energy security externalities associated with dependence on oil. E M (.) includes accident risk and road congestion. Local tailpipe emissions are also included in E M (.), given that all new passenger vehicles must meet the same emissions per mile standards, regardless of their fuel economy, and that (due to the durability of emissions control systems as well as emissions inspection programs) emission rates now show relatively modest deterioration as vehicles age .
5 Road wear and tear and noise are ignored as they are primarily caused by heavy trucks (Small et al., 1989 , FWHA 2000 .
The corrective gasoline tax, denoted , is (see Appendix):
e G and e M denote the marginal external costs (or monetized disutility) from gasoline use and mileage in $/gallon and $/mile, respectively.
The corrective tax in (2a) consists of the marginal external cost from greenhouse gases and from oil dependence. It also includes combined marginal external costs from congestion, accidents, and local emissions, net of any internalization through mileage taxes, and scaled by two factors. First is miles per gallon (1/g), to convert costs into $/gallon. However, miles per gallon is endogenous and will rise as higher fuel prices raise the demand for more fuel-efficient vehicles. In turn, this multiplies the contribution of mileage-related externalities to the corrective tax, because an incremental reduction in gasoline use is now associated with a larger reduction in vehicle miles. The second factor, denoted β and defined in (2b), is the fraction of the incremental reduction in gasoline use that comes from reduced mileage, as opposed to improved fuel economy. The smaller is β, the smaller the contribution of mileage-related externalities to the corrective gasoline tax. In fact if all of the incremental fuel reduction came from improved fuel economy, and none from reduced driving, then β = 0 and congestion, accidents, and local pollution would not affect the corrective tax.
We adopt the following functional forms:
respectively, the elasticity of vehicle mileage and gasoline/mile with respect to gasoline prices, and 0 denotes an initial value. The gasoline demand elasticity G η is the sum of these two elasticities. We take all elasticities as constant (a common assumption) which implies β is also constant.
The welfare gain ( ) from raising the gasoline tax from its current level to the corrective level is (see Appendix):
is given by the shaded triangle in Figure 4 .
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Computing the Corrective Gasoline Tax
In this section, we discuss the corrective tax under benchmark parameter assumptions and alterative scenarios. Benchmark parameters are representative of year 2007 or thereabouts.
A. Global Warming Externalities
A gallon of gasoline produces 0.0088 tons of CO 2 . Some studies (e.g., Nordhaus 2008) put the marginal damage from current CO 2 emissions at about $10/ton, while others value it at about $80/ton (e.g., Stern 2007), implying damages of $0.09 or $0.70/gallon. 6 To be conservative, we use the former for our benchmark case and the latter for sensitivity analysis.
One reason for the different estimates is that-due to long atmospheric residence times and the gradual adjustment of the climate system-today's emissions have inter-generational impacts and the present value of their damages are highly sensitive to assumed discount rates. Some analysts (e.g., Heal 2009) argue for using low rates to discount inter-generational impacts on ethical grounds (i.e., to avoid discriminating against people just because they are born in the future). Others (e.g., Nordhaus 2007) view market discounting as essential for meaningful policy analysis (i.e., to avoid perverse policy implications in other contexts).
A second reason for different CO 2 damage assessments (though not between Nordhaus and Stern) has to do with the treatment of extreme catastrophic risks. In particular, it is possible that the marginal damages from CO 2 emissions are arbitrarily large if the probability distribution over future climate damages has "fat tails", that is, the probability of increasingly catastrophic outcomes falls more slowly than marginal utility rises (with diminished consumption) in those outcomes (Weitzman 2009 ). This reflects the possibility of unstable feedback mechanisms in the climate system, such as a warming-induced release of underground methane (itself a greenhouse gas) leading to a truly catastrophic warming. Others (e.g., Nordhaus 2009) have critiqued the fat tails hypothesis on the grounds that we can head off a future catastrophic outcome by radical mitigation measures and deployment of last-resort technologies (e.g., for atmospheric removal of carbon, or deflection of incoming sunlight through scattering particulates in the atmosphere) in response to future learning about the seriousness of climate change.
For our purposes, the above controversies would be redundant if a binding cap-and-trade system is imposed on nationwide CO 2 emissions. In this case, any CO 2 reductions from higher gasoline taxes would be offset by higher emissions in other sectors. In contrast, under an economy-wide CO 2 tax, higher gasoline taxes would reduce nationwide emissions, though benefits per ton would be net of the CO 2 tax.
B. Oil Dependence
One possible externality from oil dependence is macroeconomic disruption costs from the risk of oil price shocks. However, to what extent private markets adequately internalize these risks in inventory decisions, financial hedging, purchase of high fuel economy vehicles, etc. is much disputed. The most widely cited study is Leiby (2007) who puts the uninternalized macroeconomic disruption cost at about $0.10/gallon for 2004 (Brown and Huntington 2009 reach similar conclusions). Some analysts also suggest that a gasoline tax can proxy for an oil import tariff, which could increase US welfare given its monopsony power in the world oil market. However, whether this component should factor into fuel tax assessments is unclear given that an oil import tariff would reduce welfare from a global, as opposed to US, perspective, and could even reduce US welfare if other countries can retaliate with trade protection measures.
Oil dependence may also constrain US foreign policy, for example, by making US governments reluctant to press for human rights and democratic freedoms in oil-exporting nations. And oil revenue flows may also help to fund terrorist activities and unsavory governments. However, valuing these types of geo-political costs is extremely difficult. Moreover, even if US oil consumption were significantly curtailed, the proportionate reduction in these petro-dollar flows would be relatively small, unless other major oil-consuming countries followed suit.
We assume $0.10/gallon for oil dependence externalities, though this might be viewed as a (probably conservative) "placeholder" until we have a better handle on externality valuation.
C. Other Externalities
There is reasonable consensus on local pollution damages from automobiles. We follow Small and Verhoef (2007) , pp. 104-5, and assume damages of $0.01/mile nationwide. Mortality effects (caused primarily by particulates rather than ozone) account for the vast bulk of damages. Small and Verhoef assume the value of a statistical life (VSL) for quantifying mortality is $4.15 million, after accounting for discounting of the time lag between pollution exposure and mortality, and the smaller VSL for seniors who are most at risk. Local pollution damages will likely continue their downward trend over time, as the fleet turns over and a greater share of vehicles will have been subject to recently tightened new-vehicle emissions standards. 7 Parry and Small (2005) assumed marginal congestion costs of $0.035/mile. This is based on an assessment, by FHWA (2000) , that averages over marginal congestion costs for representative road classes across urban and rural areas and time of day. Marginal traffic delays are inferred from traffic speed/traffic flow curves and are monetized assuming the value of travel time is half the market wage. The $0.035/mile figure includes an adjustment for the relatively weaker sensitivity of congested, peak-period driving (which is dominated by commuting) to fuel prices, compared with off-peak driving. We use an updated value of $0.045/mile, given that nominal wages grew about 22 percent between 2000 and 2007 while congestion delays increased by about 8 percent (CEA 2009, For accidents, Parry and Small (2005) assumed a marginal external cost of $0.03/mile. External costs include injury risks to pedestrians, a large portion of medical and property damage costs borne by third parties, and the tax-revenue component of injury-induced workplace productivity losses (other accident costs, such as injury risks in single-vehicle collisions, and foregone take-home wages from productivity losses, are assumed internal). 9 We use a value of $0.035/mile for the marginal externality, after updating for a VSL of $5.8 million, now used by US Department of Transportation (this VSL is higher than for pollution deaths, because people killed on roads are typically younger and die quickly rather than with a long lag).
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D. Elasticities and Other Data
We assume the pre-tax fuel price p G is $2.30/gallon, the combined federal and state gasoline tax is $0.40/gallon, and initial gasoline consumption is 140 billion gallons.
11 For the benchmark case we assume initial on-road fuel economy (1/g) is 22 mpg (BTS 2008, Table  4 .23). The long run gasoline demand elasticity is assumed to be -0.4, with half of the response coming from improved fuel economy and half from reduced mileage (some combination of reduced vehicle demand and reduced miles per vehicle). Thus g η = -0.2, M η = -0.2 and β = 0.5.
These assumptions are based largely on Small and Van Dender (2006) .
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As a result of legislation in 2007 and administrative action begun in 2009, fuel economy standards were fully integrated with new targets for reducing CO 2 emissions per mile for new automobiles. Manufacturers will be required to meet standards equivalent to 39 mpg for the average fuel economy of their new car fleets, and 30 mpg for their light-truck fleets, by 2016 (prior standards were 27.5 mpg for cars and 24.0 mpg for light trucks). To the extent that these regulations will be binding on all, as opposed to a subset, of auto manufacturers, the gasoline/mile elasticity will be substantially reduced, implying a much smaller β. In fact, the regulations will likely be binding, even if fuel prices were to increase by over $2/gallon, though there will still be some price responsiveness because motorists can substitute new cars for new light trucks and use existing high-mpg vehicles more intensively (Small 2009 ). In the sensitivity analysis, we consider a case when the fuel economy elasticity is 0.1 (based approximately on Small 2009), implying β = 0.67. For this case we set initial (on-road) fuel economy for passenger vehicles at 29 mpg (on-road fuel economy is lower than certified fuel economy for new vehicles by about 15 percent).
Finally, we set t M = 0 in the benchmark case, as the nationwide revenue from automobile tolls is very small relative to gasoline tax revenues. In sensitivity analysis we consider full internalization of mileage-related externalities through mileage tolls ( M M e t = ). Table 1 summarizes the corrective gasoline tax (in year 2007 $), and its impacts, under our benchmark parameters, and various sensitivity analyses where parameters are varied one at a time.
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E. Optimal Tax Estimates
Under benchmark parameters the corrective tax is $1.23/gallon. Congestion and accidents contribute most to the corrective tax, $0.52 and $0.41/gallon, respectively. Global warming, oil dependence, and local pollution each contribute about the same, $0.09-$0.12/gallon. Increasing the tax from the current rate of $0.40/gallon to the corrective level moderately increases fuel economy to 23.2 mpg and reduces overall gasoline use by 10 percent. The resulting welfare gain is $5.9 billion and tax revenues increase by 180 percent from $56 billion to $157 billion.
In the high global warming case, the optimal gasoline tax rises to $1.88/gallon, and welfare gains are almost three times as large (as both the height and the base of the shaded triangle in Figure 4 increase). However, the corrective tax falls to $1.14/gallon if there is a preexisting CO 2 cap-and-trade policy (or Pigouvian CO 2 tax that fully internalizes global warming damages).
In the (future) case with (binding) pre-existing fuel economy regulations, the corrective tax rises to $2.01/gallon. Here the mileage-related externalities-local pollution, congestion, and accidents-each contribute about 80 percent more to the corrective tax than they do in the benchmark case. This is because the reduction in mileage associated with a given reduction in gasoline use is now higher, and for two reasons. First, an assumed 67 percent (rather than 50 percent) of the marginal reduction in fuel use comes from reduced driving. Second, the distance travelled per gallon of gasoline is about a third higher than in the benchmark case.
Finally, with a pre-existing tax that fully corrects all of the mileage-related externalities, the corrective gasoline tax falls dramatically to $0.19/gallon, or about half its current rate. In this case, the tax reflects global warming and oil dependence externalities only.
The Fiscal Rationale for Gasoline Taxes
Gasoline taxes (or any corrective tax or regulation for that matter) interact with distortions in the economy created by the broader tax system, and these interactions should be taken into account to obtain an unbiased assessment of the welfare effects, and optimal level, of the tax. Here we represent the broader tax system by collapsing it into a single tax of t L on labor income, which reflects the wedge between the gross wage (which we normalize to unity) and the net wage received by households. The gross wage reflects the value marginal product of labor while the net wage reflects the marginal cost of labor supply in terms of foregone time in nonmarket activities. Changes in labor supply induced by fuel taxes therefore induce welfare effects equal to the change multiplied by t L . We first discuss adjustments to the corrective gasoline tax to account for broader fiscal interactions and then provide some sense of the empirical importance of these adjustments.
A. Fiscal Adjustments to the Corrective Gasoline Tax
As discussed in the literature on environmental tax shifts (e.g., Goulder 1995), broader fiscal interactions take two forms.
First is the tax interaction effect. This is the efficiency loss in the labor market that results when a new product tax drives up the general consumer price level, thereby reducing the real household wage and discouraging labor supply. Of course, the proportionate impact of the product tax on economy-wide labor supply will be extremely small. However, the resulting efficiency loss may still substantially change the overall welfare effect of the tax, given the huge size of the labor market in the economy, and the large wedge that results from federal and state income taxes, payroll taxes, and sales taxes. 14 Second is the revenue-recycling effect. Usually in the literature this is taken to reflect the efficiency gain from recycling environmental tax revenues in broader income tax reductions. Alternatively however, revenues from higher fuel taxes might be used to fund highway spending or, more generally, public goods, transfer payments, or deficit reduction.
There is no need to repeat here the derivations for fiscal adjustments to corrective taxes from other papers that integrate models of externalities into general equilibrium models with prior tax distortions. Instead, we simply start with the following formula derived in Parry et al. 
In this expression, δ is the efficiency gain associated with an extra dollar of government revenue (see below) and * denotes an optimal (as opposed to corrective) tax.
14 That is, the welfare change rectangle in the labor market has a small base but a large height.
In equation (5), the first adjustment to the corrective tax is the revenue-recycling effect. It equals the product of δ and the extra revenue per gallon reduction in gasoline induced by the higher fuel tax. The second adjustment is the tax-interaction effect. This includes the change in labor supply from a marginal increase in the gasoline price, multiplied by the increase in gasoline tax, per gallon reduction in gasoline. This labor supply change is multiplied by the labor tax wedge, and also by δ + 1 , to account for the efficiency cost of lost labor tax revenues.
Some manipulation gives, after decomposing the labor supply effect using the Slutsky equation, and using the Slutsky symmetry property (Parry et al. 2009 ): Suppose for now that extra revenues are used to cut labor taxes. In this case, δ is the efficiency cost of raising an extra dollar of revenue through labor taxes, or the efficiency cost from an incremental increase in t L divided by the marginal increase in revenue. Thus:
where L ε is the uncompensated labor supply elasticity. This is related to the compensated labor supply elasticity, , and the income elasticity of labor supply, via the Slutsky equation.
comp L ε
B. Quantitative Importance of Fiscal Linkages
Although there is considerable dispersion in empirical estimates, a plausible benchmark assumption is that L ε = 0.2 (e.g., Blundell and MacCurdy 1999) . This value represents an average over labor supply responses due to changes in average hours worked per employee, and labor force participation rates, across male and female workers. We use a standard value of 0.4 for the labor tax wedge, representing a compromise between the average tax rate (which affects the participation margin) and the marginal tax rate (which affects the hours on the job margin). Our values imply δ = $0.15. This corresponds to a value of 1.15 for the marginal cost of public funds (equal to 1+ δ). Note that δ is defined here relative to when revenue is not recycled, and therefore the behavioral responses underlying δ are uncompensated. In contrast, for example, if we were raising income taxes and returning revenue in lump-sum transfers to households, efficiency effects would depend in part on the compensated labor supply elasticity, implying a larger value for δ. This larger value corresponds to the marginal excess burden of taxation, as commonly defined.
If gasoline exhibits the same degree of substitution with leisure as consumption goods in general then , that is, gasoline changes in the same proportion to aggregate consumption, or labor supply, following a compensated increase in the price of leisure (Parry et al. 2009 ). From manipulating (6) and (7), we can easily show . In this case, using our value for δ, the optimal tax is about 15 percent smaller than the corrective tax. This downward adjustment reflects the balance between the externality benefit per gallon of gasoline reduced, and the efficiency cost per gallon reduced, where the latter is the tax per gallon, times 1+δ, to account for the erosion of the base of the gasoline tax (which must be offset by higher labor taxes).
If all auto passenger travel were work related, it might be reasonable to assume gasoline is an average substitute for leisure, as travel would change in rough proportion to hours worked (or total consumption) following a change in the price of leisure. However, evidence in West and Williams (2007) suggests that gasoline is a relatively weak substitute for leisure (i.e., ), a plausible explanation being that a large portion of passenger-vehicle trips are leisure-related rather than work-related. Based on West and Williams (2007), we set . With this assumption, the optimal gasoline tax rises to $1.71/gallon or about 40 percent more than the corrective tax (from equations (6), (7) and the benchmark value for ).
However, the US fiscal system distorts not only factor markets, but also the allocation of spending across ordinary consumption and tax-favored goods, like owner-occupied housing and employer-provided medical insurance. Although the tax-favored sector is small in size relative to the labor market, it is relatively more responsive to income tax changes than labor supply. This means that the efficiency costs of higher income taxes caused by exacerbating distortions in the pattern of spending can still be significant relative to efficiency costs in factor markets. Based on empirical evidence, Parry (2002) suggests that the efficiency gain from recycling a dollar of revenue in income tax reductions (relative to not recycling the dollar) might be in the order of $0.30 rather than $0.15. If so, the optimal gasoline tax rises dramatically, because the revenuerecycling effect is doubled. As indicated in Figure 5 , which is obtained from equation (6) with alternative values for δ in both the revenue-recycling and tax-interaction components, the optimal gasoline tax rises to over $3/gallon.
On the other hand, additional fuel tax revenue might be used to fund highway maintenance and expansion projects. It is difficult to put a general figure on the marginal value of highway spending, given that it will be highly project specific and that transportation agencies do not routinely conduct economic valuations of projects. In fact, a longstanding concern has been the lack of pressure for efficient allocation of highway spending, given that federal grants to states (which account for more than half of federal highway spending) are largely allocated in proportion to vehicle miles rather than degree of congestion or road quality. Empirical estimates of the social rate of return to highway spending are typically within a range of 0−30 percent (TRB 2006, Ch. 3) . If the social discount rate is 5 percent, this would imply δ is between about -0.05 and 0.25 for highway spending. 15 As indicated in Figure 5 , this would imply an optimal gasoline tax of anywhere between about $0.50 and $2.50/gallon.
More generally, extra revenues might fund (non-transport-related) public spending, or deficit reduction, though without more specifics, it is difficult to know how efficiency gains would compare with those from cutting distortionary taxes. 16 The general point here is that optimal gasoline taxes are very sensitive to alternative forms of revenue recycling-if revenues are not used to increase efficiency, the case for higher fuel taxes is considerably undermined. Correspondingly, annualized welfare gains from optimizing the gasoline tax vary enormously under alternative revenue-recycling options, from close to zero to over $30 billion ( Figure 5 ).
One caveat here is that it is not always clear what the baseline is against which the policy change should be measured. For example, fuel tax revenues may fund a spending project that would have gone ahead anyway, even without the fuel tax increase. In this case, fuel tax revenues effectively substitute for an increase in other distortionary taxes, rather than fund extra spending.
Optimal Taxes on Diesel for Heavy Trucks
A. Conceptual Framework
The corrective tax on diesel fuel consumed by heavy-duty trucks (i.e., single-unit and combination, commercial trucks) is given by:
Here, subscript D refers to diesel rather than gasoline: g D is diesel consumption per truck mile and e D is external costs per gallon of diesel. Superscript T refers to trucks rather than light-duty vehicles: β T is the portion of the marginal, price-induced, reduction in diesel that comes from reduced truck mileage; is external costs per truck mile; and is a possible tax per truck mile.
T M e T M t γ is the increase in automobile miles per unit reduction in truck miles. γ > 0 to the extent that travel speeds on congested roads increase as they are vacated by trucks (Calthrop et al. 2007 ). If γ = 0, the corrective diesel tax would be essentially analogous to the corrective gasoline tax, with parameters related to heavy truck characteristics. One exception to this is that local emissions for trucks vary (approximately) in proportion to fuel use rather than mileage, because emissions standards are defined relative to engine capacity (specifically, grams per brake horsepower-hour) rather than mileage. In addition, road damage is a significant mileage-related externality for heavy trucks and, to lesser extent, noise.
To the extent that γ > 0, the corrective diesel tax is adjusted downwards, to account for the induced increase in (fuel-and mileage-related) auto externalities. The latter are defined net of any auto mileage tolls and gasoline taxes. Net auto externalities are expressed in $/auto mile, then converted into $/gallon of diesel (via dividing by g D ), and scaled back by the portion of the reduction in diesel use that comes from reduced truck mileage, as opposed to increased fuel economy. 18 We assume analogous functional forms for truck mileage and fuel/mile as in (3) and that γ is constant.
Finally, the general presumption is that freight is an average substitute for leisure, because essentially all heavy-truck trips are work-related, and are therefore likely to exhibit a similar degree of substitution with leisure compared with goods in general (e.g., Diamond and Mirrlees 1971) . Thus, we compute the overall optimal tax using the analogous expression to (6), with .
B. Parameters
Combusting a gallon of diesel produces about 16 percent more CO 2 than combusting a gallon of gasoline 19 and therefore we adopt a (conservative) value of $0.10/gallon for global warming damages from diesel (using a higher value, or zero to reflect a pre-existing cap-andtrade program, would have comparable effects to those discussed above for gasoline taxes). We use the same placeholder value as above, $0.10/gallon, for oil dependence costs.
Based on a source-apportionment study for year 2000 by the US Environmental Protection Agency, FHWA (2000 , Table 13 ) put local air pollution costs from heavy trucks at about $0.40/gallon. We make two adjustments to this figure, which results in a cost of $0.36/gallon. First, we multiply by 4.15/2.7, which is the ratio of the VSL for local pollution assumed above to the VSL in FWHA (2000) . Second, we multiply by 0.6 to account for the decline in heavy-truck emission rates (see BTS 2008, Table 4 .38).
Based on FHWA (2000), marginal congestion costs are assumed to be twice as large as for automobiles, or $0.09/truck-mile. Trucks take up more road space and drive slower than autos, though a partly offsetting factor is that a greater share of nationwide truck mileage occurs under free flow conditions (in rural areas and at off-peak hours) than for autos.
Marginal accident costs are assumed to be 83 percent of those for autos, or $0.029/mile, based on FHWA (2000). Although, for given speeds at impact, trucks have far greater damage potential than cars, an offsetting factor is that trucks are travelling at slower speeds, and crash less often, in part because they are driven by professionals.
Road damage externalities for heavy trucks have been assessed in studies that apportion road maintenance expenditures to different vehicle classes, while noise costs have been estimated based on hedonic studies measuring how proximity to highways affects property values. We assume external costs of $0.055/mile and $0.015/mile respectively based on FHWA (2000), after updating to 2007 using the consumer price index.
We assume the pre-tax price of diesel is the same as for gasoline, an initial tax of $0.44/gallon, initial truck fuel consumption of 38 billion gallons, and fuel economy of 6 mpg.
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Although the limited evidence available suggests that diesel fuel elasticities are in the same ballpark as gasoline price elasticities (Dahl 1993, pp. 122-123, Small and Winston 1999, Table  2 .2), we might expect the fuel economy elasticity to be smaller for diesel, as technological opportunities for improving fuel economy are more limited for trucks than for cars given the high power requirements necessary to move freight (EIA 1998). We assume a diesel price elasticity of -0.25, with 40 and 60 percent respectively due to the responsiveness of fuel economy and mileage.
As regards the feedback effect on auto externalities, about 55 percent of truck travel occurs in rural areas (FHWA 2000) where congestion is minimal and therefore a reduction in truck driving would have little impact on encouraging more auto travel. For typical urban roads, a reasonable rule of thumb appears to be that roughly 70 percent of reduced truck congestion would be offset by extra auto travel (Cervo and Hansen 2002, Calthrop et al. 2007 ). We assume, nationwide, that 31 percent (equal to 70 percent times 0.45) of any reduction in congestion from trucks would be offset by extra auto travel. We double this, based on the assumption that two car miles are equivalent to one truck mile in terms of congestion, to obtain γ = 0.62 (Santos and Fraser 2006) . If diesel taxes were increased substantially, it is highly likely that gasoline taxes would go up in tandem. Therefore, in computing the auto feedback effect in (8) we use the corrective gasoline tax (and fuel economy at that tax), though we also note the implications of assuming the current gasoline tax.
C. Optimal Tax Estimates
We begin with the corrective portion of the optimal diesel tax, as summarized in Table 2 . Even though all parameters, aside from global warming and oil dependence externalities, are notably (if not substantially) different than for gasoline, overall the corrective tax is very close to that for gasoline-$1.15/gallon compared with $1.23/gallon.
On the one hand, road damage and noise combined contribute $0.26/gallon to the corrective diesel tax (and zero to the corrective gasoline tax), while the contribution of local pollution is higher for diesel, as emissions vary with all fuel reductions rather than just the portion from reduced mileage.
On the other hand, congestion contributes $0.33/gallon to the corrective diesel tax compared with $0.52/gallon for gasoline. Congestion per mile is twice as large for trucks as for autos and a larger portion of the tax-induced reduction in diesel is assumed to come from reduced vehicle mileage. However, these factors are more than offset by the much lower fuel economy of trucks, which implies that a gallon reduction in diesel fuel is associated with a much smaller reduction in vehicle miles than a gallon reduction in gasoline. For the same reason, accidents play a smaller role in the corrective diesel tax. Moreover, accident costs per truck mile are roughly the same (rather than twice as large) as for an auto mile. The auto feedback effect shaves a further $0.10/gallon off the corrective diesel tax. This effect would be $0.18 if evaluated at the current, rather than corrective, gasoline tax.
Given our assumptions, the proportionate improvement in vehicle fuel economy, and proportionate reduction in fuel use, from optimizing fuel taxes, is smaller for diesel than for gasoline. Moreover, current diesel fuel consumption is only 27 percent of that for gasoline. For these reasons, welfare gains under benchmark parameters-ignoring fiscal linkages-are $1.3 billion per year from raising diesel taxes to their corrective level, compared with $5.9 billion for the analogous gasoline tax reform.
A final point from Table 2 is that if mileage-related externalities were fully internalized through vehicle tolls the corrective diesel tax is $0.56/gallon (this assumes auto externalities are fully internalized, thereby eliminating the auto feedback effect). Figure 6 underscores the critical role of broader fiscal interactions for the diesel tax (under baseline parameters). If the efficiency gain per dollar of recycled revenue is $0.15, the optimal diesel tax is $1.06, or moderately lower than the corrective tax. Thus, the net adjustment for fiscal interactions is in the opposite direction to that for the gasoline tax, reflecting the assumption that diesel is an average, rather than a relatively weak, leisure substitute. On the other hand, if the efficiency gain from revenue recycling is $0.30 per dollar (e.g., because income taxes distort spending patterns in addition to the labor market) the optimal diesel fuel tax can rise to $3/gallon. Conversely, if revenue-recycling does not increase efficiency the optimal diesel tax not only falls below its current level, but essentially falls to zero. In this case the efficiency loss from the tax-interaction effect is large enough to offset the entire efficiency gain from externality mitigation!
Conclusion
At first glance, there appears to be a strong efficiency case for substantially increasing taxes on highway fuels-to over $1/gallon-at least for the foreseeable future, before other (more efficient) policies to largely internalize mileage-related externalities (e.g., peak-period road pricing), are widely implemented. This presumes efficient use of additional fuel tax revenues. Ideally, from an efficiency perspective, such revenues would finance reductions in distortionary income taxes, in which case the argument for higher fuel taxes is even stronger. On the other hand, the case for higher taxes is more qualified if there is some risk that revenues will not be used productively.
Our discussion ignores the distributional impact of higher fuel taxes. Studies suggest that gasoline taxes are regressive, though less so if income is measured on a lifetime rather than annual basis (e.g., Poterba 1991, West and Williams 2004) . One approach to addressing these concerns is through adjustments to the broader tax and benefit system. Williams (2009) finds that the distributional effects of gasoline taxes can be approximately offset through such adjustments, with pretty modest overall implications for the optimal gasoline tax.
Substantially higher fuel taxes appear to have little political traction at present, though it is not difficult to think of examples of policy reforms that, at some earlier date, seemed impossible to implement (e.g., industry de-regulation, use of market-based instruments for pollution control). At any rate, the economists' role is to inform about the potential net benefits from overcoming obstacles to more efficient policy.
Finally, over the long haul, the development of new technologies is critical for any effort to wean motorists off conventional fuels. Does this mean we should implement even stiffer fuel taxes? Perhaps not, as a common view among economists seems to be that innovation incentives are more efficiently addressed through supplementary technology policies, rather than raising energy taxes above levels warranted on externality and fiscal grounds (e.g., Newell 2007, Goulder and Schneider 1999) . These additional measures might include funding for basic research, inducements for applied private sector R&D, and possible interventions at the technology deployment stage, though more research is needed on the appropriate stringency and design of such supplementary measures. Note. Efficiency gain is defined relative to withholding revenues from the economy and therefore depends on uncompensated behavioral responses. Note. Efficiency gain is defined relative to withholding revenues from the economy and therefore depends on uncompensated behavioral responses. 
